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IIED WoRkIng PAPER
In spite of investments and policy reforms, Sub-
Saharan African countries lag in supplying financial 
services for agriculture and rural areas. new 
products, delivery channels, and partnerships, 
along with greater attention to savings, provide 
fresh optimism that this situation will be corrected. 
This paper examines several examples, with special 
attention to developments with savings groups 
and financial innovations with mobile phones and 
information and communication technologies 
(ICT). The telecom revolution and other innovations 
suggest that their use may leapfrog some difficult 
transportation and communication problems that 
drive up transaction costs and risks, and restrict 
financial inclusion for the poor. 
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 The slow process of developing African rural 
financial markets  6
3 Developing rural financial services: the 
paradigm shifts from agricultural credit to 
financial inclusion  8
4 Major financial service providers  10
Banks  10
Microfinance — progress and limitations 11
Member-owned financial institutions 13
Savings groups (Sgs) and VSLAs 14
Financial linkages and agents 15
Telecom revolution  16
Investment mechanisms: substitutes and 
complements for agricultural and rural finance  18
5 Risk management and mitigation strategies 
in support of finance 22
Credit life and health insurance  22
Index crop and livestock insurance  22 
Partial credit guarantees  23
Warehouse receipts systems (WRS) 24
Credit scoring 25
6 Financial infrastructure 26
Collateral registries for movable property 26
Credit bureaus  26
Term finance and land as collateral  27
7 The way forward  28
References  30
 www.iied.org 3
Financing agriculture and rural areas in sub-saharan aFrica
4     www.iied.org
1 
Introduction
The image of sub-Saharan Africa historically has largely 
been that of a poor region subject to frequent famines 
and conflicts, but is viewed today as a rapidly urbanising 
region with rising per capita incomes. It ranks second in 
population growth in the world and boasts 16 of the 29 
economies projected to grow the fastest during 2012–
2014. Rising world food prices have renewed interest 
in its potential to meet the world’s demand for food and 
fibre. Structural reforms and improved governance have 
sparked foreign investments, and some countries are 
now able to borrow on favourable terms in world capital 
markets. The telecom sector has especially captured 
considerable attention as it has helped leapfrog 
some of the region’s well-known transportation and 
communication constraints and spawned widespread 
innovation in finance. 
Access to banking and financial services has improved 
but continues to be troublesome, especially for farmers, 
rural people, the poor and women. Most Africans have 
limited access to commercial banks. There is an average 
of just 6.8 commercial bank branches per 100,000 
adults, and many countries have considerably fewer 
branches, including Malawi, Tanzania, Ethiopia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone (Ardic 
et al., 2013). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) supply 
financial services to the poor, but do not yet reach most 
enterprises and poor households in semi-urban and rural 
areas where bank branches are sparse. Member-owned 
financial institutions are important in mobilising savings, 
but many are small, suffer governance problems, are 
slow to modernise and serve few rural households. As 
a result, financial services continue to be identified as 
major constraints for agriculture. Policies designed to 
ease constraints are widely viewed as ineffective or too 
slow, especially for smallholder farmers. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarise innovations, 
along with their strengths and limitations, used to 
improve access to sustainable financial services for 
agriculture and rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa, with 
a special focus on smallholders. Section II reviews 
the impediments to the progress of developing rural 
financial markets, followed by a section outlining the 
evolution in paradigm shifts in analysing such markets. 
Section III summarises the role and constraints of 
the major categories of financial services providers 
beginning with the most formal institutions, banks, and 
ending with the least formal, savings and loan groups. 
The use of financial linkages and agents, the explosive 
growth of mobile phones for financial services and 
the emergence of investment mechanisms concludes 
the section. Section IV reviews strategies to reduce 
and manage risks including insurance, partial credit 
guarantees, warehouse receipts systems and, finally, the 
emergence of credit scoring to reduce the information 
costs of credit screening. Section V summarises the 
status of financial infrastructure investments made 
to benefit the entire financial system in collateral 
registries and credit bureaus. Section VI discusses the 
impediments for term finance and why the lack of land 
for collateral is one of the explanations. The final section 
outlines the way forward with an emphasis on savings 
groups and mobile finance. 
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The paper is based on analysis of available literature 
and documents, supplemented by discussions with 
persons knowledgeable about specific subjects. 
Caution is required in interpretation, as much of the 
information is about specific examples and case studies 
— so there are limits to generalisability for the entire 
region. Moreover, several studies use questionable 
methodology and the results may not be robust. The 
information also mostly reports positive results with 
fewer reports about failures. Few studies of innovations 
provide evidence about the distribution of benefits 
between suppliers and users of financial services. 
Space and time do not permit consideration of the 
expanding information emerging with insights about 
client preferences and demands, the nature of rural 
client preferences and the development of client-
centred products and services. generally, estimates 
of probable demand and usage of new products and 
services tend to be exaggerated. 
Financing agriculture and rural areas in sub-saharan aFrica
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2 
The slow process of 
developing African 
rural financial 
markets 
Creating competitive financial markets with sustainable 
and efficient institutions to serve large numbers 
of savers and borrowers has been a slow process 
everywhere, but often slower in Africa. The reasons 
are many and resolving them is a long and expensive 
process. In an ideal credit market, loans are traded 
competitively and interest rates are determined by 
supply and demand. The best investments are financed 
because investors with the best projects are willing 
to pay the highest interest rates. In practice, however, 
credit markets diverge from the ideal (Besley, 1994). 
In credit and insurance markets, there is asymmetric 
information (access to different information) between 
buyers and sellers, so ‘bad’ products or services are 
more likely to be selected. This may lead to adverse 
selection. For example, a lender or insurance company 
may set one price for loans or insurance cover but there 
is risk of the loans or insurance being adversely selected 
by more risky or less profitable customers. Raising 
interest rates or insurance premiums may lead low-risk 
customers to drop out of the market, leaving only a pool 
of high-risk customers willing to pay the higher costs. 
Moral hazard may also occur because one party to the 
transaction — the borrower or purchaser of insurance 
— makes the decision about the amount of risk to 
take, while the other party — the lender or insurance 
company – bears the cost if things go badly. With 
imperfect information, lenders and insurance companies 
engage in costly actions to screen customers and to 
enforce contracts. 
Lenders must evaluate the borrower’s reliability, capacity 
to repay and intention to use borrowed funds wisely. 
The borrower may promise to work diligently to repay, 
but if default occurs, it is difficult for the lender to 
determine if it was due to bad luck, mismanagement or 
unwillingness to pay. Lenders try to overcome screening 
and contracting enforcement problems by requiring 
loan collateral or collateral substitutes, charging higher 
interest rates or lending only to borrowers with proven 
repayment records or with diversified and reliable 
cash flows. or they may simply choose to deny loans, 
especially to poorer borrowers with few assets to offer 
as collateral. 
Agriculture creates special challenges for financial 
institutions due to its spatial and risk characteristics 
(Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). Land is immobile; 
production is dispersed; transport, communication and 
travel costs are high; and the seasonality of production 
creates big gaps between receipts and expenditures. 
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Several kinds of risks and uncertainties exist: (1) yield 
risks due to weather, diseases and insects; (2) market 
price risks due to local and global weather and market 
variations; (3) timing uncertainties due to farm-specific 
weather variations; (4) uncertainties in the timing of 
repairs and reinvestments; and (5) illness, accidents 
and other lifecycle risks. 
These characteristics create liquidity management 
problems for financial institutions because many 
borrowers borrow at the same time at planting and 
repay at the same time at harvest. Covariance of yields 
implies covariance of default risks, and lenders must 
carry cash reserves to meet depositor withdrawals at 
times when borrowers may be slow or unable to repay. 
High communication costs make it difficult to manage 
large banking networks needed to reduce covariate 
risks. In the absence of insurance, only small loans will 
be made without collateral. The most valuable collateral 
are assets that (1) are easiest to appropriate in the case 
of default, (2) do not easily lose their value and (3) have 
high use value to the borrowers so they will not want to 
part with them. Land tends to have the highest collateral 
value, but many African farmers do not have titles to 
the land they operate and often there is no active land 
market for lenders to liquidate land seized as collateral. 
Poor borrowers possess few high-quality assets to 
pledge as loan collateral so they are likely to be denied 
loans unless they can provide lenders with acceptable 
collateral substitutes. 
The characteristics of agriculture also have important 
implications for insurance markets. Expected and 
actual yields differ enormously by field and farm, and 
average plot sizes are small, implying high costs for 
loss assessments. Insured farmers may be less careful 
in their animal and plant husbandry practices because 
some losses will be borne by insurance. Yield risk 
introduces covariance risk, and large insurance pay-outs 
require holding large financial reserves against losses. 
Typhoons, hurricanes, droughts and other catastrophic 
events are important weather risks, and the smaller the 
country, the more difficult it is to diversify risks across a 
large area.1
In the absence of formal financial and insurance 
markets, rural families have learned to rely on traditional 
strategies and informal credit, savings and insurance 
arrangements. These include maintaining a minimum 
of cash reserves, employing traditional production 
technologies, using conservative input levels and 
maintaining reciprocal social ties that provide aid in the 
event of emergencies. Many resist using formal financial 
institutions because of the high transaction costs of 
traveling to distant locations, lack of trust in their ability 
to access their savings or loans in emergencies and 
unattractive features such as the need to attend group 
meetings or accept the responsibility of group loans. 
In most countries, therefore, richer households and 
salaried workers access formal regulated financial 
institutions in urban areas, while mostly unregulated 
informal or self-regulated member-owned arrangements 
dominate rural areas.2 
Financial sector development programs designed to 
reduce these problems have produced disappointingly 
limited results in Africa. Low levels of financial 
intermediation, relatively high interest rates, wide 
intermediation spreads and substantial bank 
profitability persist. The causes include currency and 
macroeconomic uncertainties, high government demand 
for loan funds, lack of competition, relatively small bank 
sizes and contractual problems including weak creditor 
rights, compromised courts, a deficient insolvency 
framework and a general disrespect for contracts 
(Honohan and Beck, 2007). 
Faced with these problems, governments often create 
rules, regulations and interest rate and other subsidies 
to encourage lending to underserved borrowers, 
especially for agriculture, small and medium enterprises, 
and the poor. Relatively less attention is placed on 
offering safe and attractive places for the poor to save. 
not surprisingly, quick-fix efforts to increase formal 
credit have produced patchy results because they do 
little to address underlying problems and challenges. 
Success is more likely with investments in capacity 
building and long-term institutional development at 
multiple levels. 
The recent emergence of new products, delivery 
channels and partnerships, along with greater attention 
to savings, however, provide fresh optimism that the 
traditional challenges will eventually be overcome. 
Examples are discussed in the following sections. 
1 It is difficult for most insurers and reinsurers to diversify their risks internationally.
2 Recent careful analysis of poor households reveals many informal financial arrangements used by the poor to meet financial needs. See, for example, Collins 
et al. (2009). Earlier studies showed how informal finance is also used by non-poor households to complement formal finance. For example, see Adams and 
Fitchett (1992).
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3 
Developing rural 
financial services: the 
paradigm shifts from 
agricultural credit to 
financial inclusion 
The approaches used to stimulate the development of 
financial services for rural areas have evolved over time, 
as the challenges are better understood. Beginning 
in the 1960s, subsidised agricultural credit programs 
were popularised as a way to correct the market 
failures thought to be the cause for the small amount 
of credit allocated to agriculture. These programs 
usually imposed interest rate ceilings that undermined 
the health of the financial institutions delivering credit. 
Eventually this rather naïve supply-leading approach 
was largely declared a failure so, by the 1980s, 
government failure replaced market failure as the 
fundamental problem.3
A new approach emerged known as the financial 
systems paradigm, which encompassed financial 
institutions, markets and instruments, the legal and 
regulatory environment, and financial norms and 
behaviour. The approach argued for relaxation of interest 
rate controls and developments at the micro, meso 
and macro levels. These views conveniently coincided 
with the emergence of microfinance that supplied 
small, usually non-collateralised, relatively high interest 
rate loans to the poor who lacked collateral required 
by banks. 
Microfinance initially emphasised outreach to the poor, 
especially to women. Today, this is often referred to 
serving the bottom of the pyramid. By obtaining a MFI 
loan, it was expected that poor borrowers would take 
the first step up the financial ladder and eventually 
graduate to full-service formal financial institutions. 
Critics objected to the excessive focus on credit and, 
later, robust impact studies questioned how much 
credit alone could lift people out of poverty.4 Two 
additional views then took shape. First, MFIs began 
3 For the most cited critique of the agricultural credit approach, see Adams et al. (1984).
4 A large number of microfinance impact studies have been done. Many have been criticised for using weak methodologies that produce biased results. Studies 
using a more rigorous random control trial methodology have produced mixed results regarding the claim that microfinance makes a major contribution to 
poverty reduction. The most recent example was reported by Banerjee et al. (2015). These results plus earlier studies of agricultural credit cast doubt on the 
impact of providing large amounts of credit unless other constraints are also reduced. However, a major limitation of rigorous random controls is that they usually 
focus on short-term results and so cannot capture the potential positive effects of long-term access to improved finance.
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experimenting with broadening their services to include 
savings, insurance, remittances and other financial 
services. Second, agricultural value-chain finance 
was proposed as a complementary strategy to the 
financial services approach.5 Value-chain studies have 
subsequently focused largely on how financial services 
could be increased for the small share of smallholders 
that participate in chains that are tightly structured.6 
Most analyses, however, fail to estimate how much 
smallholders actually benefit compared to other agents 
in the chains.7 Moreover, the focus on a specific product 
or enterprise rather than the entire farm and non-farm 
activities that constitute a poor household’s livelihoods 
misses the full range of financial services that may 
contribute to a household’s welfare.8 
The concept of financial inclusion emerged in the 
2000s as an even broader way to rationalise the need 
to develop financial services. It implies that everyone 
should have access to full suite of quality financial 
services, at affordable prices in a convenient manner 
with respect and dignity, delivered by competitive 
suppliers. Further, the services should match client 
needs, provide good value and avoid causing harm 
(CFI, no date). The objective of financial inclusion has 
become widely accepted as reflected in the Alliance 
for Financial Inclusion network (AFI, no date). Extreme 
views of the concept envision a cash-light or even a 
cash-free economy. 
Achieving full inclusion is a distant objective for most 
developing nations, but has spawned an explosion of 
ideas and innovations to expand access to and use of 
financial services, many involving modern information 
and communication technologies (ICTs). Several will 
be identified in this paper along with the obstacles to 
make them a reality in rural areas and applicable for 
smallholders. A frequent shortcoming is the lack of 
evidence that improved access to a particular service, 
such as digital access to payments or remittances, will 
necessarily lead recipients to move up the financial 
ladder to more comprehensive formal financial services.9
5 Agricultural value chain finance refers to the financial flows among actors within a value chain and flows to actors from outside the chains (Miller and Jones, 
2010).
6 An estimated 35 million of the world’s 500 million smallholder farmers participate in tight value chains, meaning that they are generally less poor, operate at 
least two hectares of land and take a more business-like approach to farming than other smallholders. See Christen and Anderson (2013).
7 One exception found a puzzling gap between positive impacts on enterprise income but lack of impacts on household income. This might be explained by 
methodological limitations in the analysis. See Dunn (2014).
8 See a broader analytical framework presented in USAID (2011). A policy statement of how support for value chain finance differs is found at e-MFP (2011).
9 For a proposed hierarchy of financial inclusion, see Jain et al. (2014). A digital pathway of financial inclusion is presented in Radcliffe and Voorhies (2012). 
These are useful conceptual frameworks but the actual hierarchy of financial services preferred by individual households or persons will obviously vary.
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4 
Major financial 
service providers 
This section discusses the major categories of 
African financial service providers (FSPs), their role 
in supplying financial services and constraints faced 
in serving agriculture and lower-income rural and 
urban populations. 
Banks 
All African countries have regulated domestic and 
foreign-owned commercial banks that supply financial 
products and services to businesses and households. 
Many report an increased interest in agriculture Trade 
and Export Finance (2014)10 but agricultural loans made 
by banks usually represent less than 5–10 per cent of 
their total portfolios (CABFIn 2014). They normally limit 
agricultural lending to large farmers, estates, plantations, 
agribusinesses, out-grower schemes and export crop 
value chains. Some lend to well-managed cooperatives, 
farmer associations, MFIs and rural businesses for on-
lending in cash or kind to producers. A few attempt to 
downscale and make microfinance loans. Some banks, 
such as Equity Bank in kenya (Wright and Cracknell, 
2007) and Société générale de Banques au Sénégal 
(Riquet and Debuchy, 2015), are examples of dynamic 
commercial banks using innovations to reach non-
traditional markets. 
A common complaint is that the high cost structure of 
banks is a constraint for engaging in small transactions 
with individual clients, and most invest too little to learn 
how to serve agriculture. Still, banks represent the 
best potential to serve rural areas. They often expand 
branches to tap rural savings and have the greatest 
potential to diversify risks geographically. The back 
office operations established for serving urban areas 
can be modified to serve other market segments, and 
their use of automatic cash machines (ATMs) and other 
innovations can also be used to drive down rural costs. 
They usually have the most resources to invest in new 
staff and products to serve new market segments. 
Since they are regulated, they represent the lowest risk 
for rural savers. 
Agricultural and development banks (state-owned 
and cooperative) were frequently created during the 
subsidised credit era. Most performed poorly and 
piled up mountains of unpaid loans that overwhelmed 
any good they achieved. Since it would be difficult 
to successfully reform them, a number were closed 
or privatised. However, advocates supporting reform 
began in the early 1980s to emphasise their potential 
if correctly revamped to serve the rural poor (Seibel, 
2000). The successful reforms of the Unit Desa system 
of Bank Rakyat Indonesia, the Agricultural Bank of 
Mongolia and the national Bank of Commerce in 
Tanzania were offered as evidence. 
Successful bank reform usually required two 
prerequisites. one, governments were fully committed to 
reform and to creating a firewall to protect the reformed 
bank against political interference. Two, reformed 
institutions needed to develop products and services for 
multiple categories of clients, such as microenterprises 
10 Through partnerships and minority investments, international banks are engaging with African banks and this may introduce more dynamism in their 
agricultural finance.
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and rural non-farm businesses, to reduce the risks of 
loan portfolio concentration and income covariance. 
notwithstanding this largely negative history, there are 
still supporters for special agricultural banks. Tanzania 
recently announced the creation of a new agricultural 
bank and Uganda is currently debating a proposed 
specialised Land and Agricultural Bank.
A few countries created unit rural banks expecting that 
locally owned and operated FSPs would successfully 
serve heterogeneous local markets. The best-known 
African example is the rural and community banks 
(RCBs) in ghana (Ajai and Fissha, 2012). They are 
fully owned by individual local community residents 
and currently number over a hundred with almost 600 
outlets. They had a market share of 67 per cent of 
depositors and 48 per cent of borrowers in rural areas 
in 2008 and reportedly reduced rural credit constraints. 
It is unclear how many loans are made to agriculture 
because most are included in the reported 41 per cent 
market share of microcredit loans. An apex bank was 
created to aid with clearance functions. Historically, 
the network suffered from capacity constraints, 
unfavourable operating environments, excessive 
directed lending requirements that limited flexibility in 
managing risk and covariant risk in a major drought, 
leading to poor performance and closures. Several of 
these problems continue. Moreover, competitors are 
becoming more prevalent and are undermining the RCB 
advantage in serving local markets.11
Several measures have been tried to nudge banks to 
become more active in rural areas, such as setting 
minimum quotas for agricultural lending, requiring the 
opening of rural branches in exchange for licenses to 
open urban branches, and subsidy auctions for opening 
new branches. There is little conclusive evidence that 
regulations or incentives make a significant contribution 
unless the bank is committed to expand into rural 
areas.12 In namibia, Bank Windhoek credits the grants 
of the Department for International Development (DFID) 
for sharing the costs of designing strategies, products 
and services needed for new community banks built in 
sparsely settled rural areas with poor infrastructure and 
where agriculture largely consists of livestock producers 
who have only a few seasonal sales and savings 
deposits (napier, 2010). 
Microfinance — progress 
and limitations
MFIs make small loans mostly to the unbanked poor, 
usually with few assets required as loan collateral by 
banks. non-governmental organisations (ngos) that 
offered microcredit were highly touted beginning in the 
late 1970s for their ability to reach the poor and lift them 
out of poverty with microcredit. Today, MFIs serve many 
poor households in Africa with opportunities to save and 
to receive loans. As of August 2014, 262 MFIs reported 
to the MIX Market with a total of 7.4 million borrowers 
and US$7.8 billion in gross loan portfolio (MIX Market, 
no date). The region is unusual because more clients 
are served by savings-led MFIs than by credit-only 
providers. The small average size of accounts suggests 
the majority of clients must be poor savers (MIX 
Market, 2013). Although many MFIs pursue objectives 
beyond savings and credit, this section focuses on their 
traditional financial services. 
MFIs are heterogeneous, including banks that 
downscale to serve lower-income market segments, 
traditional savings-led member-owned institutions and 
ngos, some of which aspire to achieve some type of 
regulated bank status. There are countries with a special 
MFI regulatory framework that determines if they can 
accept deposits and transact with only members or the 
general public.13
group lending with peer screening of clients and 
peer pressure to assure repayment was the standard 
model until MFIs began to experiment with individual 
loans.14 This technology performs best in densely 
populated urban and semi-urban areas where 
large pools of potential clients with multiple cash 
inflows can pay frequent instalments for small loans. 
over-lending in urban markets and the search for 
sustainability by MFIs contributes to their search for 
new markets in semi-urban and rural areas. Successfully 
serving small farmers involves a total institutional 
commitment including modifying products, adopting 
individual lending, hiring specialised loan officers and 
modifications in management information systems to 
track individual loans with irregular payments.15
11 The Philippines also created hundreds of unit rural banks in the subsidised credit era of the 1970s and experienced similar difficulties. Some survived and have 
become more viable by modernising and adopting microfinance methods and ICT applications.
12 There has been considerable analysis of India’s aggressive policy of bank branching and credit controls beginning in the 1970s. One study suggested that 
the availability of banks was a more important determinant of fertiliser demand and aggregate crop output than interest rates (Binswanger et al., 1993). A 
related study suggested that the impact on agricultural output of the requirement to expand branches and loans was modest at best but had a greater impact 
on the non-farm rural economy (Binswanger and Khandker, 1995). A third study concluded that the policy of branch expansion into rural unbanked locations 
significantly reduced rural poverty through increased deposit mobilisation and credit disbursement but the costs and benefits could not be estimated (Burgess 
and Pande, 2005).
13 The multi-tiered example of regulations in the Cameroon is described by Fotabong (2012).
14 The power and limitations of group lending was tested in Malawi (Simtowe et al., 2006).
15 A study in Latin America identified how several of these factors contributed to MFI success in agricultural lending (IFC, 2014).
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Two MFI models of agricultural lending demonstrate 
different approaches. The german firm Internationale 
Projekt Consult (IPC) was a pioneer in adopting 
individual loans for farm lending using a credit-only 
approach. It successfully created a profitable product 
for an El Salvador ngo, and later transferred it to 
Centenary Bank in Uganda. Cash flow analysis is 
used to evaluate borrower repayment capacity. Small 
loans in Uganda started at roughly US$60 for a term 
of three to six months and, after successful repayment, 
borrowers could graduate to larger loans. Various types 
of collateral and collateral substitutes are accepted 
(Meyer, 2014). Agricultural loans today are reported to 
be about 19 per cent of the total loan portfolio. 
A group lending credit-plus approach that assists 
farmers with input acquisition and marketing is followed 
by the opportunity International Bank of Malawi. It 
began as a savings-led commercial bank that targeted 
economically underserved people. Lending is done 
through groups of 10–30 persons, mostly women. It 
has tested several innovations to expand rural access 
including: (1) fixed outlets (mobile units, kiosks and 
satellite centres) and mobile vans; (2) ATMs; (3) Point 
of Sale devices through participating retail outlets, 
gas stations, agricultural supply shops and competitor 
banks; and (4) smart cards issued with biometric 
identification (kalanda and Campbell, 2008). Analysis 
of mobile van use plus an advertising campaign 
showed that savings accounts and loans increased. 
Even though the van may reduce some costs, many 
households preferred using informal sources, including 
money lenders, landlords, Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (RoSCAs), friends, neighbours, relatives 
and local grocery stores because of lower transactions 
cost (Sharma and nagarajan, 2011). gPS-supported 
systems were tested to verify plot sizes and aid in 
setting application rates for crop inputs and reporting 
yields. It is unclear if the high costs of these innovations 
are compensated through increased revenue or if they 
require subsidisation. Many of these innovations were 
also adopted by opportunity Bank in Mozambique 
(AgriFin, no date).
MFIs are experimenting with mobile phones and other 
ICT applications to reduce costs and risks, but there 
is little information about their effectiveness.16 They 
face limitations in serving agriculture. To minimise 
risks, they must limit the size and length of loans and 
total portfolio exposure to agriculture. They generally 
cannot fund the larger and longer-term loans often 
required for successfully developing value chains. 
Their interest rate structure may be higher than some 
farmers and enterprises can pay, so rural non-farm firms 
with upstream and downstream linkages to farming 
may be better customers. Some MFIs experience 
sufficient strength and become large enough to convert 
into microbanks, especially if there are special MFI 
regulations. Strong MFIs attract external investors and 
grants, and loan from banks but many have not reached 
high levels of efficiency and self-sufficiency. Credit-plus 
MFIs seek grants and soft funding to fund non-credit 
services and some, such as the famous BRAC ngo in 
Bangladesh, reach huge scale with this approach. 
MFIs in sub-Saharan Africa have high operating 
expenses of 19 per cent compared to global levels 
of 14 per cent. The reasons are the high staff costs 
common in markets where skilled labour is scarce, 
high transaction costs of reaching rural areas and high 
costs of managing savings. The regulatory framework 
can be a constraint while supervision has often been 
weak. Seventeen of 48 sub-Saharan African countries 
had interest rate caps in 2010 and there are threats 
of ceilings being imposed in other countries (CgAP/
MIX, 2011).17 Caps often impose a large gap between 
the ceilings and the real FSP cost structures. This 
factor contributed to weak MFIs being placed under 
government administration.18 A study of MFI rural finance 
operations mostly in West Africa reported that smaller 
loan sizes in rural compared to urban areas negatively 
affected their sustainability (De Bruyne, 2014). 
A study of 30 greenfield (newly created) MFIs started 
by holding companies in 2000–2012 demonstrates the 
challenge of creating sustainable FSPs in Africa (Earne 
et al., 2014). They are spread over 12 countries and are 
regulated, mostly deposit-taking institutions, focusing on 
micro and small businesses. By 2012, they together had 
more than 700,000 loan accounts, loans of US$527 
million and almost two million deposit accounts with a 
balance of US$445 million in 700 branches employing 
more than 11,000 staff. Several were created by IPC 
which, after trying both bank downsizing and ngo-
first models, concluded that the fastest way to achieve 
profitability while serving lower-income clients was to 
start greenfield banks.19 AccessHoldings started six 
16 One robust effort to evaluate effectiveness is found in Cull et al. (2014).
17 They were the eight countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) plus Ghana, Guinea, Eritrea, Mauritania, Namibia, Nigeria, Sudan, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe (CGAP/MIX, 2011).
18 For example, as of June 2010, BCEAO, the regional central bank for West Africa, reported that 13 MFIs in the eight countries of WAEMU were under 
government administration. See ibid.
19 Recently ProCredit sold its operations in Africa except in the Congo and system-wide eliminated all loans of less than US$5000.
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greenfield MFI banks and all are expanding branches 
and expanding into agricultural lending. 
The greenfield performance was compared with a peer 
group of MFIs without strong network connections 
selected from the MIX database (MIX, no date). After 
operating for 60 months, the 30 greenfield MFIs were 
considerably larger with greater outreach, higher loan 
quality, better profitability and were better capitalised 
and had more formal structures and deposit-taking 
infrastructure. Holding companies have the advantage of 
transferring knowledge and learning from one greenfield 
to another. no data were presented on loan sizes or 
types of clients so it is unclear if the greenfields serve 
the same market segment as the peer group. The 
greenfield portfolio yields of around 55 per cent imply 
they charge equally high interest rates.
on average, each greenfield bank starts operations with 
equity capital of approximately US$4–5 million, and 
a budget for hiring start-up and technical assistance 
staff clustering around US$4 million of which grants 
represent an average of US$3 million. The cost 
of creating a greenfield deposit-taking branch in 
Eastern Europe was about US$50,000 compared to 
US$150,000–400,000 in Africa where operating costs 
are also higher. A simulation showed the expected 
internal rate of return at five years is approximately 1 per 
cent without grants, but approximately 14 per cent with 
the grants. Even a 14 per cent return is likely to be below 
what many development finance institutions (DFIs) 
and social investors consider acceptable. greenfield 
investments may be financially promising, but this is 
not likely to happen over a period of 5–8 years, which 
may be what investors would consider a reasonable 
time horizon. 
greenfield expansion has slowed in Africa and about 
25 countries have none. This suggests that investors 
have concluded that they offer less favourable financial 
prospects, and points to the financial challenge that 
African FSPs face in supplying sustainable services. 
The challenge must be even greater in smaller markets 
with dispersed rural and farm populations and the 
agricultural environment is less favourable. 
Member-owned financial 
institutions
Member-owned FSPs, sometimes called community-
based financial organisations, are a heterogeneous 
category that includes traditional indigenous RoSCAs 
and accumulating savings and credit associations 
(ASCAs)20, Financial Service Associations (FSAs)21 
and more formal cooperatives and savings and credit 
cooperatives (SACCos; commonly known elsewhere 
as credit unions), some of which are registered and 
(usually) lightly supervised. As noted in the next section, 
a new effort is being made in many countries to create 
small informal savings groups and village level savings 
and loans associations (VSLAs) that operate similarly to 
indigenous ASCAs. 
Thousands of these FSPs with millions of members 
exist in Africa, and an estimated seven per cent of 
the African population belongs to cooperatives. For 
example, as of 31 December 2012, kenya reported 
215 deposit-taking SACCoS, of which 124 had been 
licensed. Total membership was about three million 
(SASRA, 2012). one of the largest has over 80,000 
members. There are also about 136 rural-based FSAs 
with a total membership of about 780,000. Member-
owned FSPs should have an advantage in serving poor 
and distant populations because they use member 
volunteers rather than paid employees. However, most 
have a chequered history and generally have not been 
innovative leaders for either micro or agricultural finance. 
An International Labour organization study concluded 
that the problems in many countries can be attributed 
to using cooperatives to serve state interests (Develtere 
et al., 2008). Especially in the Anglophone region, 
they have often been engulfed in state politics, so the 
solution is to disentangle from the state and to operate 
on business principles. 
Some financial cooperatives are huge and successful, 
while others are small, suffer from poor governance 
and resist modernisation despite considerable foreign 
assistance.22 Member-owned organisations face a basic 
conflict because the members are simultaneously users 
and owners.23 They can be successful when conflicts 
20 ROSCAs typically are autonomously formed groups composed of several members that meet periodically to pool savings and distribute the ‘pot’ to one 
member. They continue meeting until every member has received the pot. ASCAs are similar except that savings can be accumulated and lent to members and 
non-members.
21 The K_REP Development Agency of Kenya has developed several FSAs in Kenya and other African countries. FSAs are registered under the Companies 
Act as companies limited by shares. They are run explicitly as profit-making businesses. Dividends are generally higher than for cooperatives because of their 
business orientation. Unlike cooperatives that operate with one vote per member, the voting rights of FSAs depend on number of shares held up to a pre-set 
maximum (often 10 votes per person). This encourages more active governance/oversight from individuals with larger numbers of shares. They are principally 
investor-driven, reflected in high interest rates for borrowers, and zero interest rates for depositors. See Wright et al. (2000).
22 See Meyer et al. (2004) for a discussion of the poor condition of many member-owned financial institutions in Uganda in 2004 and how government 
intervention complicated efforts to strengthen the sector. A USAID project to rehabilitate 14 SACCOs was terminated early in 2004 because they were slow to 
improve and reluctant to adopt modern techniques, design new products, adopt prudent policies, elect responsible board members and hire competent staff. A 
contributing problem was the overlapping responsibilities between the Registrar of Cooperatives, the Uganda Cooperative Alliance and the Uganda Cooperative 
Savings and Credit Union Ltd.
23 The nature and types of these conflicts are discussed in detail by Cuevas and Fischer (2006).
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are managed and they are supported with a strong 
system of regulation and supervision. 
The successful financial cooperatives usually meet 
two conditions. First, they have sustainable business 
models offering products and services at reasonable 
costs that members demand. They are cautious in 
growth, including rural outreach, and in expanding 
product range and client base. Second, they depend 
primarily on resources from members or cooperative 
networks rather than governments or donors. often 
they are members of federations, associations or 
unions that provide technical backstopping and monitor 
performance and adherence to best cooperative 
practices World Bank (2007).24 Donors that are eager 
for fast results in strengthening cooperatives may be 
challenged by the need to follow a slower institution 
process of technical assistance and training.25 A World 
Bank project in Mexico is an example of using an 
institutional development approach to strengthen credit 
unions so they qualify for new regulatory requirements, 
and to assist them with ICT technologies used to 
incorporate rural members (WoCCU, no date). 
Savings groups (SGs) and 
VSLAs
Several recent microfinance impact evaluations using 
randomised controlled trials found fairly modest 
positive impacts due to microloans and prompted more 
attention to finding sustainable ways to supply secure 
and valued saving services for the poor.26 International 
and domestic organisations now promote informal 
self-regulated Sgs that operate similarly to ASCAs to 
help poor households manage their financial affairs as a 
complement to the many informal methods reported in 
the financial diaries.27 They are called Self-Help groups 
in India, and are referred to as VSLAs in many African 
countries. At the end of 2014, an estimated 135,000 
groups existed in 27 African countries with about three 
million members and average savings of US$30 per 
member.28 Each consists of 15–30 members, usually 
women, who meet regularly to deposit savings in a 
fund for loans made to group members. At the end of 
a fixed cycle (usually 9–12 months), all savings with 
accumulated interest and fees are distributed among 
group members and a new cycle begins. Savings are 
held in a simple strong box, often with three locks with 
three members each entrusted with a key. In situations 
where members have few numeracy skills, no written 
accounts are used.29 
Several advantages of Sgs have been identified 
(karlan, 2014). Member trust and governance skills 
are built through frequent liquidation and distribution 
of savings, and by conducting all transactions in the 
presence of all group members. no outside capital is 
required, the interest paid remains in the community, 
the project costs of organising groups is modest and 
the commitment to save regularly may stimulate savings 
and reduce non-essential spending. Transitioning 
to larger and longer-term ASCAs generally requires 
adopting paper-based accounting, so training costs 
rise although much of the training is done by volunteers 
recruited in training-the-trainer programs. With or 
without further assistance, some groups build linkages 
with formal FSPs. For example, Sgs in nairobi slums 
grafted onto M-PESA telecommunications and 
banking for depositing their savings balances, and 
even facilitated group investments in the kenyan stock 
market (Wilson, 2010). A limitation, especially for those 
with poor members, is their limited savings capacity 
and, therefore, the limited ability to intermediate large 
amounts of savings or offer larger and longer-term loans 
to their members. 
A summary of randomised controlled trials conducted 
of Sgs in seven African countries produced evidence of 
mixed impacts measured at the community level (not at 
the individual member level) (gash and odell, 2013).30 
They successfully reached the poor but members 
tended to be wealthier and more financially active than 
non-members. The groups increased savings and credit 
use in treatment areas, but the findings about asset 
ownership, increased business-related spending, profits 
and the likelihood of a woman owning a business were 
mixed. There were also mixed and limited impacts on 
health and education spending and school enrolment. 
24 The worldwide credit union experience also stresses the importance of savings mobilisation for good governance. See Branch and Klaehn (2002).
25 Guidelines have been identified for donor support for member-owned financial institutions in rural Africa but they are quite general and based on relatively few 
case studies. See Athmer and Bosch (2013).
26 Six of these evaluations were recently published along with a summary article (Banerjee et al., 2015).
27 A new book outlines the evolution of several international organisations that support the creation of savings groups (Ashe and Jagger Neilan, 2014).
28 As reported in SAVIX (no date), a database for savings groups created from data supplied by several international NGOs that promote them. It does not include 
groups formed by domestic NGOs.
29 The fact that groups are usually composed mostly of women helps reduce the gender gap in the use of both formal and informal finance. See Johnson and 
Nino-Zarazua (2011).
30 The details about the Mali program, the study methodology and the detailed results are found in Beaman et al. (2014).
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A lively debate exists about whether or not linkages 
should be encouraged between Sgs and formal FSPs. 
Advantages for both the Sg members and FSPs have 
been identified (Bankable Frontier Associates, 2014a, 
2014b). However, others have advocated caution saying 
that such linkages may undermine their strong savings 
orientation and reduce the attractive interest earnings 
of members who are net savers (for example see Allen, 
2010). Moreover, most members are believed to seek 
ways to smooth consumption and meet relatively small 
expenditures such as paying school fees rather than 
save for larger business investments. Relationships 
among group members may be damaged if FSPs 
require that group savings be used as collateral for 
individual loans. 
Through the Banking on Change partnership, Barclays 
Bank, CARE International Uk and Plan Uk are working 
to link Sgs to formal banking services in Africa (Egypt, 
ghana, kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia), Asia (India, Indonesia and Vietnam) and South 
America (Peru). The specific approach is adapted to 
the conditions found in each country. The partnership 
reached over 500,000 persons in its first three years 
(Allan et al., 2013). 
one of the most advanced linkages was developed 
in the pilot project of the CARE International kenya 
partnership with Equity Bank and orange kenya (a 
mobile network operator) designed to link 200 mature 
Sgs with Equity Bank. A mobile money application 
through mobile phones was created to facilitate 
access and reduce member transaction costs (Care 
International in kenya, 2013). CARE identified the 
potential demand because groups reported problems 
such as insufficient savings to meet loan requests, 
security issues towards the end of a saving cycle when 
cash boxes have large amounts of cash, loan terms 
(1–3 months) too short for seasonal or agricultural 
businesses and loans for larger investments (more than 
US$50) were not available and generally impossible 
to repay within the short term. Mature Sgs could opt 
for participating in a linkage if there was a clear group 
consensus to do so. Considerable training was provided 
for all participants. The partnership created a special 
Equity savings account (Pamoja) linked with a new 
mobile phone application (orange Money and Eazzy 
24/7) that allows rural groups to manage their money 
through their mobile phones and Equity’s extensive 
agent banking network. Both the groups and individuals 
open accounts making mobile cash transfers possible. 
group officials can transact in Equity branches, via 
mobile phones during group meetings and through 
orange Money agents or ATM machines. Through 
an arrangement among Mobile network operators 
(Mnos), the users of any mobile phone in the country 
can access the application. 
Providing opportunities for linkages needs to be 
carefully considered. Projects that provide strong 
incentives for linkages and for FSPs to lend to Sgs will 
likely undermine them. However, most Sg members in 
rural areas will not likely move up the financial ladder 
if they are left to autonomously link with FSPs. The 
process will be especially difficult in remote areas far 
from FSPs unless new technologies are used to reduce 
transaction costs. The expansion of mobile phones and 
agent banking may encourage FSPs and telecoms to 
actively seek Sg savings as a way to protect against 
theft of the strongboxes, and this may lead to individual 
savings accounts and eventually to loans.31
An alternative path would be for some Sgs to attempt 
to build on the trust and governance skills that members 
develop to evolve into informal SACCos and later even 
into formal regulated status, but this would be a large 
and long-term undertaking. There is little evidence 
that they are moving in that direction, so linkages offer 
a more feasible path. Third-party facilitators, such 
as ngos, may be critical to success but only if they 
have the resources and vision to train Sg members 
properly and promote transparency and consumer 
protection policies. 
Financial linkages and 
agents
Many types of linkages and agent relationships are 
used in finance to overcome barriers, expand market 
access and control costs. FSPs and telecoms are 
among the biggest creators and users of partnerships, 
alliances and agents (gallardo et al., 2006). These 
relationships permit FSPs to access resources, reduce 
transaction costs, acquire technical and management 
skills, link up to banking technology and infrastructure, 
and expand access to financial services. To a greater 
or lesser extent, all such arrangements involve the 
principal–agent problem or agency dilemma that 
occurs when one person or entity (the agent) makes 
decisions that impact, or on behalf of, another person 
or entity (the principal). The dilemma exists because 
an agent is sometimes motivated to act in his/her own 
best interests rather than those of the principal. A 
variety of contractual and other methods must be used 
31 In August 2014, Airtel Uganda, Grameen Foundation and Plan Uganda launched a new group savings option to store their group’s cash as mobile money 
(Grameen Foundation, no date).
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to minimise these problems. Agent relationships can 
take many forms. Sometimes they are exclusive and are 
similar to employees, such as the operator of a kiosk 
that sells airtime for one telecom. In other cases, a retail 
shop operator may have a business where one of many 
activities is to process operations for one or more banks 
or telecoms or even governmental agencies. 
A FAo study analysed financial linkages between formal 
and less formal FSPs that expanded access to more 
and higher quality products and services (Pagura and 
kirsten, 2006), with the focus on linkages serving the 
rural poor. For example, the Mali Banque nationale de 
Développement Agricole supplies bulk loans, credit 
lines and savings accounts to kafo Jiginew, the largest 
network of SACCos, and CVECA-on, a large village 
bank network, to manage cash flow variability and/or 
portfolio expansion. In Rwanda, the apex, Union des 
Banques Populaires de Rwanda, is able to penetrate 
into rural markets through its network with Peoples 
Banks (banques populaires — essentially credit 
unions). Privatised microfinance banks and financial 
ngos use linkages to expand scale in competitive 
markets. Unexpected negative consequences can 
occur, however, when subsidised linkages stimulate 
FSPs to ‘cream-off’ existing MFI clients, crowd out 
potential entrants in the market and/or discourage the 
savings culture. 
Successful linkages must resolve issues of contract 
design, risk and profit sharing and conflict resolution. 
Capacity building is needed at two levels. First, 
informal partners need strengthening to effectively 
manage savings and credit if they link with commercial 
banks, apexes, insurers and so on. Second, MFIs 
need strengthening to build and maintain linkages, to 
design partnership contracts, to update management 
information systems (MIS) to track revenues and costs, 
and to evaluate the costs and benefits of partnerships.32
Many FSPs are entering into agent banking. An agent 
can be any retail entity, including post offices, lottery 
outlets, supermarkets and other small retail agents. 
They are not licensed to handle deposit or withdrawal 
functions on their own, but can do so on behalf of a 
FSP. Agents are also used by telecoms to sell air time 
and take on broader functions. As a form of branchless 
banking, FSPs use agents to avoid the expense of 
brick and mortar branches and to reduce the cost of 
conducting many small cash transactions for poor 
people (Dermish, 2011). Agents use ICT innovations 
such as mobile phones, debit and prepaid cards, 
tablets and card readers to conduct transactions 
with their partners. Some are also cash-in, cash-out 
(CICo) agents that convert electronic money into 
cash. over the counter (oVC) agents perform payment 
transactions on behalf of customers who do not have a 
mobile money account with a mobile phone company. 
Some agents are authorised to open money market and 
bank accounts, but many are restricted to processing 
transactions. Creating, managing and supervising 
agents, providing them with an attractive business 
proposition, and creating a supportive regulatory 
framework with adequate consumer protections is a 
complicated task (for a kenyan example, see McCaffrey 
et al. (2014). The widespread use of oVC agents 
for money transfers in some countries may be highly 
useful for people but not necessarily a good indicator 
of eagerness to use mobile money or for a cashless 
economy (see Arabehety, 2013). 
The experience of Brazil demonstrates that agent 
banking alone does not necessarily lead to an expansion 
of the formal financial frontier in areas with few FSP 
branches. By 2013, Brazil had expanded into the world’s 
largest network with close to 400,000 banking agents 
(called correspondents) while the number of bank 
branches remained relatively constant. The network is 
used for the county’s huge conditional cash transfer 
system for the poor that is estimated to reach about 14 
million households. An evaluation showed that agents 
generally did not make the hoped for contribution to 
financial inclusion (Sanford, 2013). Two-thirds of the 
population pays at least one bill with an agent, but only a 
minority uses them for other financial services. only 12 
per cent with bank accounts usually withdraw through 
an agent, 9 per cent deposit through an agent, only 6 
per cent have accessed a loan and only 4 per cent have 
opened a bank account through an agent even though 
many agents are authorised to provide these services. 
However, because there is a tendency for those that 
use correspondents to be poorer, live in remote areas 
and are more likely to be women, agent banking 
makes a positive impact on financial inclusion for 
them. Improvements in service quality are required for 
correspondents to become wider conduits for financial 
access in Brazil and elsewhere. 
Telecom revolution 
The large number of Africans with access to mobile 
phones but not to formal financial services offers the 
potential for the most transformative innovation in 
financial services since the emergence of microfinance. 
The hotbed of this innovation is East Africa where 
mobile phone penetration is the greatest. FSPs 
are finding ways to use the technology to lower the 
transaction costs of expanding rural outreach, but 
telecoms are also directly competing with FSPs to 
provide financial services. Person-to-person (P2P) 
32 The conditions for successful linkages between formal and informal intermediaries were sketched out for Ghana (Jones et al., 2000).
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mobile payments are increasing and several countries 
have an objective of becoming cashless or cash-light 
societies. Mobile phones are also transforming the ways 
farmers and rural people access information, products 
and services that can indirectly support finance. For 
example, rural producers can more easily access 
market information leading to better price and market 
opportunities (Aker, 2010; Muto and Yamano, 2009) 
and the rural population can receive governmental 
support services and payments (Aker et al., 2012). This 
section highlights some key innovations and constraints. 
Different business models exist for using mobile phones 
in finance: (1) direct banking channels, (2) Mnos 
that provide wireless communications services as 
technology and channel partners, (3) Mnos as bank 
agents, (4) institutions and retailers as bank partners, 
(5) direct customer channels with institutions as agents 
and (6) Mnos as direct FSPs (Chopra and Wright, 
2011). Competition among these channels and the rules 
of the game set by regulators determine how the mix of 
channels evolves over time in each country. 
A recent report from the leading information source 
provides a comprehensive view of mobile money 
developments (Pénicaud and katakam, 2013). It 
is based on self-reporting by 98 service providers 
submitting information on mobile money, 21 on mobile 
insurance and 16 on mobile credit and savings. Mobile 
money is a service that allows financial transactions to 
be conducted over a mobile phone. It includes transfers 
and payments such as P2P and government-to-persons 
(g2P) transfers, bill payments, bulk payments, merchant 
payments and international remittances. Providers that 
offer mobile phones as just another channel to access 
traditional banking products are not included.
Mobile money was available in 36 of 47 African 
countries by 2013. Many have two or more mobile 
money services, implying a need for interoperability 
since most are closed loop systems requiring electronic 
money be converted to cash to send to someone using 
a competing service. There were 98 million registered 
mobile money accounts in sub-Saharan Africa with 34 
per cent concentrated in East Africa.33 In seven markets, 
Mnos are permitted to provide mobile money services 
so they contribute directly to financial inclusion but 
most mobile accounts are inactive, suggesting cash 
transactions still dominate. Mobile money is offered 
through mobile wallets, but the most popular method 
is use of oVC agents performing transactions for 
unregistered customers. Almost 40 per cent of the 
agents reportedly were ‘rural’ but there is no standard 
definition of rural.34 Most agents were inactive and 
performed less than one transaction during June 2013. 
Even the active agents performed so few transactions 
that many may need to be eliminated, which may reduce 
rural access. 
Almost three-quarters of total transactions are P2P 
transfers and airtime top-ups with bill paying second 
in importance. Bulk payments including both salary 
payments and g2P payments is third, and less useful 
unless providers have a large distribution network 
capable of managing large amounts of liquidity. 
Companies and merchants have started to use mobile 
money to accept and make large-scale payments.35 
Rural residents could benefit when mobile money 
becomes more widespread. For example, many 
already receive transfers from family members who 
migrated to cities and desire to send money home, 
and purchasers of farm products are beginning to 
make mobile payments to producers in value chains. 
Mobile insurance, credit and savings services are 
also potentially important, but the business case is 
challenging because providers must use sales forces 
to acquire customers rather than rely on mobile money 
agents. The most successful applications to date 
are in kenya and Tanzania where mobile money has 
reached scale.36
Several mobile money providers offer mobile insurance, 
mostly life cover, with the balance offering health, 
accident or agricultural insurance. For example, the 
mobile provider Tigo in Senegal offers a ‘freemium’ 
product; customers are given a minimum of free 
insurance and can buy additional paid coverage. Within 
a year and a half, 180,000 subscribers qualified, with 
a majority opting for the paid version, suggesting a 
demand for life insurance. MicroEnsure offers a variation 
of this model in ghana and Tanzania. 
33 In contrast to East Africa, a collaboration between UNCDF and the MasterCard Foundation expects that only by 2020 will 10–12 per cent of the adult 
population in Benin, Senegal and Zambia be able to conduct financial services via mobile channels on a regular basis (UNCDF, no date).
34 Additional analysis (ibid, page 25) was conducted of the geographic locations of financial access points, including commercial bank branches, ATMs, MFIs, 
mobile money agents, savings and credit cooperatives, and MFI deposit taking institutions in Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. It revealed that fewer poorer and 
rural people lived within five kilometres of a service point compared to richer and more urban populations.
35 A new application is the use of mobile money by persons and businesses to pay tax obligations in Tanzania, Kenya and Mauritius (GSMA, no date).
36 Kenya has the most registered mobile money accounts — more than the number of adults — while Tanzania has the largest ratio of mobile transactions to GDP 
(CGAP, 2014).
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M-Shwari, a credit and savings product offered by 
Safaricom37 to its M-PESA mobile phone customers in 
kenya through a partnership with the Commercial Bank 
of Africa (CBA), is the best-known African example of 
savings and loans through phones. Safaricom has to 
manage a vast network of CICo agents to accept and 
pay out cash. Customers can apply for loans, open 
bank accounts and move funds from their mobile wallet 
to an interest-bearing bank account once they have 
been subscribers for at least six months. Past usage of 
Safaricom services determines initial loan limits, while 
subsequent loans are based on savings with M-Shwari 
and the repayment history of M-Shwari loans. Loan 
sizes are only up to US$235, have a 30-day term and 
require a facility fee of 7.5 per cent. Disbursements and 
repayments are made through M-PESA. Late payments 
trigger automatic roll-overs and a much higher interest 
rate. Deposit accounts at CBA have risen from 35,000 
to over five million in less than a year to become the 
second largest kenyan bank in number of accounts.38 In 
Tanzania, Vodacom has joined forces with the CBA to 
offer M-Pawa, which is similar to M-PESA. 
Musoni, a kenyan start-up MFI, uses local offices 
to acquire customers rather than rely on agents. 
Borrowers must have mobile money accounts for use 
in loan disbursements and repayments. It is partnering 
with First Access to experiment with credit scoring 
algorithms using airtime purchases and call history data 
(First Access, no date). 
Celpay, a third-party payment company headquartered 
in the netherlands, operates a mobile banking 
platform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and Zambia. It offers deposit taking and a range of 
payment services in which customers can deposit 
and withdraw at participating registered banks and 
Celpay outlets. The target market is mobile payments 
through wallets between suppliers and distributional 
networks, breweries and Mnos. Business-to-business 
payments (B2B) for small businesses have been 
credited with bringing some of the unbanked into banks 
(napier, 2010). 
East Africa is clearly the leading region in these 
innovations, but actual usage is still in its early stages. 
The experience of mobile money, credit and savings to 
date suggests that much needs to be learned about 
customer acceptance, but they have the potential to 
meaningfully increase financial inclusion and reduce 
transaction costs for both suppliers and users. The 
ease of usage, structure of fees, nature of consumer 
protection and interoperability among providers will 
affect consumer acceptance.
Analysis suggests that future access and usage of 
mobile banking applications will depend on three sets of 
factors. First, there are issues of access to phones and 
charging facilities, and the possibilities that will arise 
with future technological developments with phones 
and Wi-Fi. Second is a need to develop trust among 
users who are not accustomed to dealing with banking, 
much less mobile banking, and to create products and 
services they really value. Third, the future structure and 
impact of the industry will depend on the competition 
and cooperation that develops between FSPs, banks 
and telecoms, and the nature of the regulatory regimes 
evolving in each country — for example, see Hammond 
(2010) and Porteous (2014). 
Rural areas pose special challenges (Frydrych and 
Aschim, 2014). First, lack of infrastructure creates 
logistical challenges for agent and cash management. 
Second, rural customers have specific financial needs, 
so an effective value proposition for innovations must 
be tailored for them. Third, rural customers generally 
have lower literacy levels so a suitably user-friendly 
interface with the technology is required. Fourth, lack 
of formal identification documents requires regulatory 
solutions that facilitate customer adoption. To date, 
most providers have relied on a natural progression of 
expansion from urban to rural areas without thinking 
critically about ways to meet these challenges.
Investment mechanisms: 
substitutes and 
complements for 
agricultural and rural 
finance 
Private and social investment is increasing in sub-
Saharan Africa, and considerable attention is given 
to its role in expanding and modernising the region’s 
agriculture. Several investment strategies are 
summarised in this section to demonstrate the potential 
for substituting for and/or partnering with FSPs. Some 
invest in start-up agribusinesses with the potential 
to grow and eventually obtain funding from FSPs. 
FSPs can also directly partner with government and 
development agencies, ngos and private investors 
that increase borrower creditworthiness by reducing 
barriers in supplying inputs and technical services 
and improving market access. Many of these activities 
indirectly support finance through improved livelihoods 
37 Initial funding for the Vodafone/Safaricom pilot for mobile P2P funds transfer came from the DFID Financial Sector Deepening Challenge Fund. See Napier 
(2010).
38 Field work has been completed for research being conducted on the impact of M-Shwari (IMTFI, no date).
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for farm and non-farm households so that they become 
better financial customers. Although many development 
projects do not involve explicit partnerships, donors 
have long advocated greater coordination. For example, 
USAID has introduced the concept of co-locate, 
coordinate and communicate for its projects and this will 
encourage more partnerships (for example see USAID/
Malawi, 2013).
Most private investment is believed to be channelled into 
larger scale projects, while some investment vehicles 
and development projects focus on value chains 
involving smallholders and smaller agribusinesses. 
The Dalberg group argued for massive investments to 
support smallholders (Dalberg group, 2012). It argued 
that the world’s 450 million smallholder farmers (about 
50 million in Africa) have a largely unmet global demand 
for finance as large as US$450 billion. Social lenders 
and local state sources are estimated to satisfy less 
than two per cent of the demand. Social lenders largely 
work through cooperatives or producer organisations, 
and only about 10 per cent of the world’s smallholders 
participate in such organisations. To meet the need, 
Dalberg proposed a strategy focusing on value chains 
with donors and impact investors providing foundational 
capital, multinational buyers working with lenders to 
facilitate financing with purchase contracts as collateral 
and commercial and social lenders matching their 
capabilities with relevant needs and opportunities.
Two initiatives grew out of the Dalberg report. The first, 
the Initiative on Smallholder Finance, will demonstrate 
how specific models and products can expand bank 
financing for smallholders (global Development 
Incubator, no date). The second, the Council on 
Smallholder Agricultural Finance (CSAF), is an alliance 
of social lending institutions that target agricultural 
businesses in the ‘missing middle’ in low- and middle-
income countries (CSAF, no date). The members 
will convene on a pre-competitive basis to exchange 
learning, identify best practices and develop industry 
standards covering market growth, responsible lending 
principles and social and environmental impact.
Although most MFIs only supply microloans, many 
operate credit-plus programs and cover the cost of 
financial services with financial income, and use grants 
and soft funding to cover the ‘plus’ components. The 
target group generally is not the very poor, but one 
new approach has that objective. The CgAP/Ford 
Foundation graduation project developed guidelines for 
organisations that follow a five-step program in which 
grants and training are initially used to build household 
livelihoods for the very poor so that they develop the 
productive capacity to graduate eventually into standard 
microfinance programs.39 Ethiopia and ghana were 
among the ten countries included in pilot programs (de 
Montesquiou et al., 2014). 
Many private investors and development agencies 
target value chains rather than improving financial 
services for a wider range of customers. The role of 
development agencies is usually limited to facilitating 
rather than making direct investments. An example 
is TechnoServe’s support of chains in Malawi and 
Tanzania. It recommends that facilitators assist chains 
to obtain financing rather than provide it directly or 
subsidise the costs of the business. The fact that a 
chain provides an assured supply of production inputs 
and a market for smallholders is often sufficient to 
reduce lending risks so that FSPs will provide financing 
(Miller and Jones, 2010). 
A relatively new promising development is the creation 
of special private and social investment funds for 
investing in African agriculture. A forthcoming FAo 
report identified 63 agricultural investment funds, 
almost all funded by development-oriented investors 
including DFIs and private foundations, that emphasise 
development impact (Miller et al., in press). The total 
capital base amounted to approximately US$5 billion 
with recently established funds mostly smaller than the 
average size of US$80 million. over 60 per cent focus 
exclusively on agriculture and 25 per cent focus on 
Africa. Several have grant-funded technical assistance 
components. Although the profit objectives of these 
funds may naturally lead them to invest in larger firms, 
some benefits may trickle down to smallholders, 
especially those that support domestic small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) gearing up to supply 
emerging African supermarkets. These investments may 
also encourage FSPs to supply working capital to the 
producers and non-farm firms in which the funds invest. 
An oxfam report, however, is cautious about the 
potential impact of socially responsible investment funds 
(Doran et al., 2009). High transaction costs and fund 
economics imply they will exclude small investments. 
With highly paid management teams, it is infeasible 
for them to make investments of substantially less than 
US$1 million. Most funds are based in Europe or the 
US, so transaction costs are high unless they link with 
local agents or companies to facilitate deal-sourcing. 
Moreover, many countries will not attract investments 
because legal protections for investors are weak and 
exit options limited. 
39 The inspiration for this concept came from BRAC, the huge NGO in Bangladesh that designed an approach to serve the very poor who are unable to manage 
a standard microfinance loan. BRAC supports a variety of financial and non-financial products for millions in the country, and is one of the largest NGOs in the 
world (BRAC, no date).
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A rather unique investment approach is followed 
by AgDevCo, a non-profit social impact investor 
and agribusiness project developer involved in 
producing and processing food crops for national 
and regional markets. It promotes ‘patient capital’ 
through investments in early stage agribusinesses. It 
is a promoter or co-promoter of greenfield agricultural 
opportunities to support emergent commercial and 
small-scale farmers too large for microfinance but 
too small for private equity.40 The support continues 
until the businesses can attract private investors. Its 
investments range from US$250,000 to around US$4 
million, and it seeks a return of around ten per cent per 
annum on debt. Some concessional finance may be 
used for projects with direct benefits for smallholder 
farmers. Total funding of more than US$100 million 
has been supplied by several sources including private 
sources, and DFID, USAID, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Alliance for a green Revolution in Africa and the Africa 
Enterprise Challenge Fund. As of July 2014, it had 
invested US$43 million in over 40 agribusinesses 
(AgDevCo, no date). 
Root Capital, a member of the CSAF, is an example 
of a non-profit social investment fund that lends and 
also provides financial advisory services to African 
businesses too big for microfinance, but generally 
unable to secure credit from commercial banks. The 
loans range from US$50,000 to US$2 million to rural 
small and growing businesses. It lends short-term trade 
credit and pre-harvest loans with terms up to 18 months 
for purchasing products from farmer suppliers, and 
long-term fixed-asset loans with terms up to five years 
for investment in equipment and infrastructure. Since 
1999, it reportedly lent over US$500 million dollars to 
more than 400 businesses, which reportedly improved 
livelihoods for more than 500,000 rural households in 
Africa and Latin America (Root Capital, no date).
Another social enterprise, the one Acre Fund, uses a 
value-chain livelihoods approach in kenya, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Tanzania to improve farm income (one 
Acre Fund, no date). It provides a ‘service bundle’ that 
includes education, finance, seed, fertiliser and market 
facilitation. Inputs are delivered to the farmer along with 
instructions on how to use them. It currently reaches 
over 200,000 farmers who mainly produce maize for 
home consumption, and plans to launch one new 
country per year. Field expenses include farm inputs 
and logistics, local staff, in-country headquarters and 
a ‘HQ charge’ paid to the international headquarters. 
The earnings cover about 80 per cent of the costs. 
Donor grants cover the operating shortfall along with 
significant R&D expenses, including new country 
scouting, product innovation and service innovation. 
Unlike many ngos, it does not aim to work itself out 
of a job by developing local suppliers and markets, but 
plans to continue to serve farmers with other livelihood 
strategies. At the speed it is expanding, it may become 
the BRAC of Africa.41
Applications of crowdfunding are emerging as another 
potential funding source in developing countries to 
leapfrog traditional financial markets. They are channels 
for promising projects to raise funds over the internet 
from multiple individuals — see Raymond (2014) and 
infoDev/The World Bank (2013). They take many forms 
but are essentially a modern and extended version of 
the traditional way family and friends supply funds for 
new ventures. Their success depends on favourable 
regulations, modern ICT, cultural acceptance and the 
creation of trust between financial contributors and 
recipients. The funding can be provided as a donation 
or in exchange for a reward or prize at a later date, or as 
debt, or equity in the form of a percentage ownership in 
the venture. 
Examples include kiva.org through which over a 
million lenders have lent about US$660 million in 
zero interest loans to almost 300 MFIs (field agents) 
for interest-bearing loans to selected clients. kiva 
Zip uses social networking in a new pilot in kenya in 
which the lenders make zero interest loans directly to 
entrepreneurs who must first obtain funding from 15 
persons in their networks. Village Capital also employs 
a version of peer support when it selects entrepreneurs 
with projects to participate in a training program at 
the end of which they together decide which projects 
to recommend for funding, mostly through partner 
organisations. one training program was conducted 
in kenya in 2014 and another is scheduled for East 
Africa in 2015 (VillageCapital, no date). In yet another 
example, since 2006 over 30,000 borrowers, close to 
95 per cent women, borrowed low interest loans from 
social investors for microenterprises in India (LinkedIn 
Pulse, 2014). 
Several crowdfunding platforms have emerged for 
sub-Saharan Africa due to the increase in the middle 
class, rapid adoption of mobile technology and market 
need. one that conducts infrastructure project-
based crowdfunding is Homestrings (no date). It has 
demonstrated the power of tapping diaspora (nationals 
living abroad) investment interests. Between its launch 
in 2011 and February 2013, it reportedly mobilised 
about US$25 million in funds with a range of products, 
projects, funds, bonds and public–private partnership 
opportunities. It covered 13 African countries with 
kenya, ghana and nigeria the primary focus. 
40 The addition of patient capital may be necessary in order for private equity funds to reach smaller and riskier enterprises. See Silici and Locke (2013). 
41 See footnote 40.
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The factors expected to be favourable to support 
crowdfunding were found to be a strong social media 
usage, high degree of early stage entrepreneurial 
activity, strong friends and family funding networks 
and access to education. kenya was found to have 
improved in several categories, so it is not surprising 
it has been the focus of many initiatives. As important 
as crowdfunding may become, it is unlikely to make 
a significant impact on Africa’s agriculture in the near 
future. First, many countries do not have the conditions 
conducive to its emergence. Second, conditions are 
not likely to improve enough in the near future so that 
investors will develop trust that their funds will be used 
as proposed. Third, the successful entrepreneurs will 
be those most capable of communicating compelling 
stories about their business prospects and will be 
backed up by credible peers or the ‘crowd’. These 
entrepreneurs will demonstrate they have the know-
how to access export markets or serve high-end local 
markets, such as the small kenyan business ojay 
greene (www.ojaygreene.com), which has been a 
kiva borrower and was selected by peers for funding 
during the kenyan Village Capital training program (see 
YouTube, no date). 
There has been little analysis on the impact of the 
investment vehicles described above. Evaluations are 
needed to determine if foreign investment crowds in 
or crowds out domestic investment42 and if it induces 
FSPs to become more active in rural areas and in 
agriculture. Although individual enterprises may benefit 
from improved access to investment capital, the macro 
impact may be limited. If investors cherry-pick the most 
promising and less risky projects, there will be fewer 
spill-over effects compared to a venture capital strategy 
of selecting challenging but promising projects, and 
using subsidies for technical assistance and local 
training and management. Important learning about the 
potential returns and risks of investing in agriculture 
can only occur if investors share experiences, both 
good and bad. Preparing smallholders for private sector 
investment is as important as preparing investors 
to invest in smallholder production (USAID, 2014). 
Moreover, investors may have already exhausted the 
best opportunities for high return, low-risk export crops 
leaving the harder task of nurturing SMEs that target 
local markets and the smallholders that sell to them.
42 A Ghana study concluded that for the period 1976–2007, foreign investment tended to crowd in domestic investment in agriculture (Gameli Djokoto et al., 
2014). 
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5 
Risk management and 
mitigation strategies 
in support of finance
Several strategies are being employed in Africa to 
reduce and manage risk for FSPs and households. For 
example, credit guarantees and warehouse receipts 
schemes are being implemented with the hope that they 
will induce more lending by FSPs. Insurance is also 
offered to households to help them manage risks with 
spill-over benefits also expected for FSPs. This section 
reviews these strategies. 
Credit life and health 
insurance 
Microinsurance is one of the most rapidly expanding 
microfinance products intended to help the poor 
respond to emergencies. The objectives are as varied 
as improving access to health care, increasing food 
security and coping with climate change. Insurance 
is marketed directly by insurance companies or in 
partnership with MFIs and other organisations that 
work with the poor. occasionally MFIs design their own 
microinsurance programs. 
A significant proportion of Africans with life insurance 
have credit life that covers the outstanding loan principal 
and interest upon the death of the borrower (Vargas Hill 
et al., 2014). It is often automatically bundled with loans. 
When borrowers learn the benefits, it is hoped they will 
become receptive to other insurance products but they 
may also respond negatively if they perceive little value. 
For example, dropouts rose when an Indian MFI bundled 
health insurance with loans because borrowers did not 
want to pay higher interest rates. This led to a fall in 
business profits (Banerjee et al., 2014). 
The lack of understanding about health insurance, high 
costs due to limited scale and the resulting low uptake 
constrain its development. A study of microinsurance 
schemes identified factors associated with successful 
scale (Thom et al., 2014). The majority of market-based 
schemes that reach scale do so by offering simple 
products such as credit life insurance. Agricultural, 
asset and health insurance were major beneficiaries of 
government subsidies, while life products receive most 
donor subsidies. 
Index crop and livestock 
insurance43 
Crop and livestock insurance could reduce climate 
and disease related farming risks, and perhaps induce 
farmers to adopt riskier but higher return technologies 
or enterprises (Cole et al., 2013). It can also reduce 
risks for FSPs. Index-based insurance raised hopes 
for a feasible method of reaching smallholders but it is 
43 Parts of this section were drawn from Meyer (2011).
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proving to be complex both to design and gain farmer 
acceptance. A major disadvantage is that basis risk (the 
risk that pay-outs may not match farmer losses) makes it 
difficult for farmers to understand. 
An IFAD/World Food Program review of pilot 
index insurance programs identified key drivers of 
sustainability and areas for subsidisation (Hazell et 
al., 2010). Two types of data are often lacking, which 
complicates creating actuarially sound index insurance. 
one is time-series weather observations to create the 
index — generally rainfall and temperature. The second 
is time-series crop yields or livestock deaths to correlate 
with weather data. Weather data from satellites has 
been proposed as an alternative to ground-level weather 
stations but the concept has not yet been robustly 
tested (Rosema et al., 2014).
The World Bank identified a fundamental issue with 
insurance based on its several pilot projects (World 
Bank, 2011). Agricultural insurance does not fit the 
general insurance model of sustainability where 
attractive premiums can be offered because the insured 
risks occur infrequently to relatively few of the insured, 
and the insurer’s total losses are low. Sustainability 
suffers because of high dropout rates by farmers who 
purchase insurance but receive no pay-out due to basis 
risk. The best potential may be to market it through risk 
aggregators, such as banks or input suppliers, rather 
than directly to farmers.
Climate change poses challenges that further 
complicate the technical issues. Farmers may need to 
adopt risk reducing practices, which is the objective of 
a few microinsurance schemes (Baarsch et al., 2013). 
For example, the kilimo Salama insurance product 
was launched by the Syngenta Foundation in 2009 to 
assist farmers cope with changing weather by insuring 
agricultural inputs.44 only farmers purchasing drought-
resistant hybrid seeds can insure as little as one 
kilogram of seeds. The large investment for hardware 
and software, obtaining government approvals and 
developing relationships with dealers, farmers and 
others raises questions about long-term viability.45
other recent insurance developments include the 
creation of the African Risk Capacity agency with 
the objective of merging disaster relief with concepts 
of risk pooling and transfer for a sustainable Africa-
wide strategy for managing climate risks (ARC, no 
date). Another initiative is the Agricultural Insurance 
Development Program created to support countries in 
implementing sustainable, cost-effective public–private 
partnerships for agricultural insurance (AIDP, 2013). 
It will engage in institution building through capacity 
improvement, policy dialogue, advisory services and 
knowledge management activities. It will also develop 
approaches to measure if the benefits derived from 
insurance justify the subsidies necessary to stimulate 
uptake and cover costs. 
Most of these insurance schemes have not been 
comprehensively evaluated, so the impacts on 
participants and their potential commercial sustainability 
are uncertain. Even if technical issues can be resolved, 
lack of farmer acceptance and willingness to pay imply 
it will need to be subsidised as is crop insurance in high 
income countries. Subsidies generally favour wealthier 
farm households, thereby eroding poverty objectives, 
and they rarely work as planned (Skees et al., 2007). 
Partial credit guarantees 
Credit guarantee funds are frequently used to induce 
lending to specific target groups. It is hoped through 
learning, lenders will become more effective in loan 
underwriting and lend to the target group without 
needing guarantees. There are at least three problems 
with this rationale. First, if reluctance to lend is due to 
legal and regulatory problems, high rates earned on 
government securities, or other problems, the first best 
strategy is to undertake reforms to directly address the 
problems. Second, the rationale for an international 
guarantee appears naïve. How can external guarantors, 
who know little about local conditions faced by lenders, 
evaluate credit risks better than local lenders? Third, 
if local lenders think a particular category of borrower, 
such as small farmers, will likely default, why should they 
lend if they will lose, perhaps 50 per cent of the losses 
not covered by guarantees?
Studies beginning in the 1990s have been cautious 
about expecting significant impacts from guarantees 
because of little clear evidence of additionality, and 
many guarantees have not been sustainable without 
subsidies (Honohan, 2010).46 USAID has conducted 
several recent evaluations. They reported several 
44 By 2013 it had insured close to 200,000 farmers in Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania. It was converted in 2014 to the Agriculture and Climatic Risk Enterprise 
Limited (ACRE), and received an investment from Grameen Credit Agricole. It is the first insurance brokerage firm to reach smallholders and pay claims through 
mobile phone technology (Grameen Credit Agricole, 2015).
45 See more details in Grossman and Tarazi (2014). See also a discussion of how Kilimo Salama developed a system of pay outs based on weather conditions 
and data from special weather centres so the service can be automated and verified using low-cost technology for faster market uptake (Pénicaud and 
Katakam, 2013). Also see comments about sustainability in Stone et al. (2012).
46 Several studies are also cited in Meyer (2011).
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positive impacts but the research methods were too 
questionable to clearly conclude guarantees ‘caused’ 
additionality in lending. USAID guarantees are offered 
to complement its other development projects, 
which may be necessary for successful lending in 
addition to its guarantees (USAID, 2013). Lenders 
may believe that achieving low default rates requires 
guarantees combined with other donor programs.47 
Training on the technology and best practices for 
sustainable agricultural lending that is provided 
along with guarantees may have greater impact than 
the guarantees. Robust evaluations are needed to 
determine if credit guarantees produce the desired 
impacts and are worthy of so much donor support. 
Warehouse receipts systems 
(WRS)48
Warehouse receipts are a common method to 
catalyse agricultural lending by collateralising stored 
commodities. Additional benefits may include secure 
places for storage leading to reduced price variations 
across seasons, and permit farmers to avoid selling 
immediately at harvest. These systems are not well 
developed in Africa and are usually used by a few 
large borrowers, usually importers, under collateral 
management agreements with international inspection 
companies. Models funded by donors have often 
failed because of limited scale economies and policies 
that damage incentives for storage by importing 
commodities during grain shortages (Coulter, 2009). 
The requirements for successful warehouse lending are 
demanding and cannot be easily met by small farmer 
associations or cooperatives without considerable 
outside support.49 
There are two African examples of village-level 
warehouse programs designed to avoid the problems 
of large-scale warehouse management. A rice inventory 
credit product called ‘grenier commun villageois’ is 
offered by the Caisses d’Épargne et de Crédit Agricole 
Mutuels de Madagascar (Bouquet et al., 2009). Six-
month loans allow producers to store harvests until the 
lean season when market prices are normally higher. 
It is accessible to small-scale producers because 
the minimum quantity required for a loan is only 75 
kilograms. Storage is provided in local warehouses 
secured by two locks, one held by the credit officer 
and another by the warehouse representative. Interest 
rates are three per cent per month for a minimum 
of five months. Both rich and poor producers use 
the storage, but poorer households value it more for 
consumption smoothing and to forcibly save rice for 
family consumption. 
In kenya, the grameen Foundation in collaboration 
with Farm Concern International is designing an 
e-warehouse pilot for maize farmers that involves on-
farm/group/village-level storage, verification checks 
involving a special mobile phone application, market 
price SMS updates and buyer forums to connect to 
markets (grameen Foundation, 2014; grossman and 
Tarazi, 2014). Village knowledge workers recruit and 
train farmers to operate the system. grain can be stored 
at home, collectively with other farmers or in village-level 
warehouses. A mobile-based tool is used to upload 
information about amount, storage method and moisture 
content, and a gPS device records locations to ensure 
that data are not remotely invented and that the grain 
can be tracked. The project prepares loan eligibility 
information shared with a partner FSP to make credit 
decisions and disburse loans. Loans cover 50 per cent 
of the grain’s stored value. Four challenges have been 
identified. one is finding financial institutions willing to 
commit the required resources. A second is convincing 
farmers eager for cash at harvest to wait for the 
e-warehouse processing. Third, ensuring data accuracy 
is challenging and, fourth, financial sustainability has not 
yet been determined. 
USAID is analysing the use of ICT, including mobile 
phone and internet services, radio, digital devices, 
cameras, geographic information systems and hand-
held computing devices, in WRSs and commodity 
exchanges (CEXs) (USAID, 2012). The primary use in 
WRSs and CEXs has been to shift from paper-based 
to electronic systems, to accommodate 24-hour trading, 
speed transaction times and reduce back office costs. 
There has been little analysis in Africa to evaluate if ICT 
use provides benefits to smallholders or improves the 
competitiveness of agricultural value chains. Its use is 
rarely, if ever, a critical factor in establishing sustainable 
operations; it may even be a distraction from other 
critical components needed for success. A potential 
strategy may be to first target the commercial sector 
(mainly large traders and processors) in order to build 
up trading volumes needed for sustainability, and then 
subsidise the incorporation of smallholders. 
47 The PASS Trust in Tanzania is an example of a ‘guarantee plus’ project designed to increase finance for agricultural SMEs. It supports them to develop 
business plans to present to commercial banks and a credit guarantee is offered to banks to reduce their lending risks. It has been subsidised by Danida for 14 
years, is now approaching sustainability and is being tested in neighbouring countries. See Stone et al. (2012).
48 Parts of this section were drawn from Meyer (2011).
49 An example in Uganda involving a USAID pilot with the 2100 members is described in Besigye (2009).
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Credit scoring
one of the major impediments to smallholder lending is 
the high cost of evaluating borrower creditworthiness. 
Personnel costs are high, especially in Africa where 
the relationship between personnel costs and small 
loan sizes is particularly unfavourable. group lending 
is less desirable than individual lending, which is better 
able to adjust loan terms and conditions to the needs 
and capacities of individual borrowers. However, it is 
expensive to use ‘expert’ loan officers to collect and 
evaluate borrowers and estimate anticipated household 
cash flows. Experiments with credit scoring are being 
tested to reduce these information costs. 
Scoring is a form of risk assessment based on a 
statistical analysis of factors expected to affect 
creditworthiness. The feasibility of scoring was rejected 
by MFIs more than a decade ago, because it requires 
electronic data that most did not have for many past 
loans, client characteristics, loan contracts and rejected 
applicants (Schreiner, 2003). Even with such data, 
score cards were not expected to replace loan officer 
subjective evaluation of risk. Therefore, they relied 
on subjective judgments to construct score cards 
(opportunity International, 2008). They use expert 
judgment to identify 3–5 factors affecting risk, and then 
lending policies and pricing decisions are set related to 
borrower risk profiles. The design and implementation 
of a system in a Central Africa bank was estimated 
at US$11,500 — the benefits included an increase 
in productivity, decline in non-performing loans and 
increased customer satisfaction due to quicker loan 
decisions (Singh and Venkata, 2013). 
Mobile phones create new scoring possibilities.50 
First Access is designing scoring systems for use by 
the Musoni MFI in kenya and other MFIs in Tanzania 
(First Access, no date). If successful, a loan officer 
would access a loan applicant’s mobile phone records 
which, combined with other digital data, would produce 
a credit decision to be shared with the applicant in 
minutes. InVenture offers a self-reporting financial 
tracking tool for small businesses along with a credit 
scoring system designed to assist them to grow and 
access finance (Inventure, no date). The data inputted 
by customers is combined with data from mobile 
money transactions and other sources to produce 
daily business profit and loss statements and to credit 
score customers. By combining mobile phone data and 
repayment data from a credit card company in Brazil, 
Cignifi successfully created scores to segment and 
target customers for a new credit product (Cignify, no 
date). Psychometric data are reportedly being collected 
in Africa for use in scoring but the only analysis located 
describes the effectiveness of using African data in a 
Peruvian MFI (klinger et al., 2013). 
Another scoring application incorporates specialised 
agricultural information. The Agricultural Loan 
Evaluation System (Frankfurt School of Finance 
and Management, 2013) is a model to assess loan 
applications for agricultural enterprises in Tajikistan, 
Turkey and Senegal. It calculates the farmer’s ‘most 
likely minimum income’ based on average production 
costs. Agricultural data (average yields, selling prices, 
working capital requirements, production processes 
and related costs) are used to create ‘tech cards’. The 
costs of up to 30 different crops are inserted into a 
tool that automatically calculates total working capital 
requirements and expected yield/income based on 
the qualitative and quantitative information provided. A 
summary report suggests loan limits for each type of 
loan product requested. 
The effectiveness and efficiency of these scoring 
methods have not yet been clearly demonstrated. Using 
mobile phone and other data, such as P2P and utility 
bill payments, may be effective with relatively ‘data rich’ 
urban microentrepreneurs, but less likely to effectively 
screen rural populations and especially ‘data poor’ 
smallholders. Scoring applications using additional 
information about farm and farmer characteristics, 
accessibility to markets and quality of the natural 
resource base will likely generate better results. The 
complexity of sophisticated models and the need for 
skilled people to design and continuously update and 
improve them slows the development of this innovation. 
50 The possible use of digital data in finance is discussed in Kumar and Muhota (2012).
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6 
Financial 
infrastructure
Financial infrastructure including institutions, 
information, technologies, rules and standards is the 
foundation for a modern financial system (World Bank 
and IFC, 2009). Creating this infrastructure requires 
investments in public goods that benefit all financial 
institutions. Such investments may generate a greater 
return than investments in individual FSPs as occurs in 
many development projects. This section summarises 
the role of collateral registries and credit bureaus as key 
parts of financial infrastructure. 
Collateral registries for 
movable property
Collateral is expected to make two contributions to 
lending: it signals that borrowers are serious about 
repaying and provides a secondary opportunity for 
lenders to recover part or all of outstanding loans 
that are defaulted. The value of movable property as 
collateral is restricted, however, when there are no 
functioning laws and registries to govern secured 
transactions. Credit registries can increase access to 
FSP finance at better interest rates and longer loan 
maturities, and the effect may be larger for smaller 
firms (Love et al., 2013). Registries are typically owned 
and operated by regulatory bodies to collect credit 
information from regulated FSPs. Their primary objective 
is to support banking supervision and provide data to 
regulated FSPs so they can better manage credit risk. 
non-regulated institutions, such as MFIs and member-
owned institutions, can often choose whether or not to 
participate (Lyman et al., 2011). 
Africa’s first web-based collateral registry was launched 
in ghana in 2010 and allows small-scale entrepreneurs 
to list movable property as collateral. To date, it is 
reported to have facilitated financing to more than 9000 
SMEs and 30,000 microenterprises. Tanzania opened 
a credit reference databank for financial institutions 
to share and access the credit history of individuals 
and businesses, and 35 banks were submitting data 
within six months (IFC, 2013). Important design issues 
for registries include ownership and management 
of the registries, comprehensiveness, accessibility 
and financing.51
Credit bureaus 
Credit bureaus are expected to improve credit 
market performance in four ways. First, details about 
loan applicant characteristics and financing history 
should improve accuracy in client screening. Second, 
improvements in informal processes of information 
exchange about customers should improve FSP loan 
terms and conditions. Third, borrower discipline may be 
enhanced when they know that financial information will 
be shared about them. Finally, client over-indebtedness 
may be reduced where borrowing from multiple sources 
occurs (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000). 
Credit bureaus merge information about a borrower’s 
credit history to create comprehensive credit history 
reports, and sometimes credit scores, that are sold to 
FSPs. Most are privately operated, for-profit entities 
(Lyman et al., 2011). The costs of submitting data and 
obtaining reports get passed on to customers directly or 
51 The IFC also assisted China to create a national online registry for pledges of receivables for leasing. See an analysis in Stone et al. (2012).
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indirectly. Sometimes MFIs create their own databases 
and share credit histories, and in some markets these 
have evolved into privately owned and operated credit 
bureaus. Fifteen sub-Saharan African countries are 
reported to have private credit bureaus (IFC, no date), 
but the region lags in several measures of credit 
information (IFC, 2012a). 
There are no evaluations of how African credit bureaus 
have been designed, the level of participation by FSPs 
that serve agriculture and the impacts on improving 
access to financial services. one impact study was 
located outside the region. An evaluation of a MFI-
created system was conducted for a guatemalan MFI, 
and it showed improvements in repayment performance 
and employee efficiency. The authors concluded that 
bureaus are relatively low-cost and should be part of 
financial deepening programs (de Janvry et al., 2010). 
An important credit bureau issue is the extent to 
which coverage includes FSPs that target low-income 
borrowers. Although 26 sub-Saharan African countries 
have public credit registries and 13 have private credit 
bureaus, MFIs participate only in Burundi, Mozambique, 
Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda (CgAP/
MIX, 2011). Three factors may constrain participation. 
First, the costs may seem prohibitive because many 
small FSPs are only semi-automated or use manual 
systems, so upgrades in MIS systems will be needed 
to compile and submit data. A second design issue 
concerns the quality and value of credit reports. 
Borrowers must be uniquely identified, and the reports 
produced must be useful, with a minimum of errors, and 
tailored to the appropriate market segment. Third, FSPs 
must build awareness among consumers whose data 
are shared so that building a favourable credit history 
influences borrower behaviour. The full benefits of credit 
bureaus may not emerge, therefore, until competition 
increases among FSPs and borrowing from multiple 
sources occurs more frequently. 
Term finance and land as 
collateral 
Term finance is generally not available for farmers 
and agribusinesses in Africa for two major reasons. 
First, FSPs generally consider it too risky compared 
to supplying smaller, short-term, working capital loans. 
Therefore, major long-term investments in large-scale 
farms, plantations and agribusinesses in traditional 
sectors, such as bananas, coffee, cotton, sugar 
and tea, are often financed by foreign investors and 
financial institutions better able to deal with the risks 
(Hollinger, 2004). Second, term loans are a special 
challenge for FSPs because of the potential mismatch 
in term structure of assets and liabilities. Term lending 
requires stable long-term savings, which are scarce 
in most countries. The emergence of private pension 
systems could provide opportunities in the future for 
well-managed FSPs to tap long-term funding sources 
(Ashiagbor et al., 2014).
Leasing can reduce lending risks in countries with 
weak business environments, particularly with weak 
creditor rights and collateral laws and registries. Leasing 
companies are reported to lease agricultural equipment 
in Brazil and India, but the one African case studied, the 
Development Finance Company Uganda, had only five 
per cent of its portfolio in agriculture (IFC, 2012b).52 
Recent efforts to finance medium-term loans and leases 
for smaller scale farmers and SMEs in Africa have been 
largely supported by donors or international agencies.53 
The issue of secure access to and use of land is a 
complicated subject, but must be resolved if the rate of 
agricultural growth and term lending are to increase in 
Africa. A new report recommends a ten-step strategy 
to scale up reforms and investments (Byamugisha, 
2013). The first element is to improve tenure security 
over communal lands, which are among the 90 per 
cent of unregistered rural lands in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Byamugisha, 2013; page 7). This could have at 
least three positive impacts. First, the combination 
of increased foreign direct investment and higher 
population and economic growth have increased land 
values and demand for communal lands, and this makes 
traditional landholders vulnerable to dispossession. 
Second, preliminary evidence in Africa finds a positive 
relationship between tenure security and land-related 
investments. Third, land with secure tenure is the most 
valuable collateral for agricultural lending, so improved 
tenure should improve access to more and lower-cost 
term loans (Byamugisha, 2013; page 36). For the 
latter to occur, however, farmers must have greater 
access to FSPs, and be willing to offer titled land as 
loan collateral. Social resistance must be addressed 
because some owners resist offering land as collateral 
even when land titles are granted.54 This makes socially 
acceptable land reforms both necessary and difficult 
to achieve. 
52 The need for technical support and after-sales services was identified as a serious issue affecting successful leasing in the Southern African Development 
Community region. See Stone et al. (2012).
53 A proposal was outlined several years ago for medium term lending in Africa but it appears to have never been seriously considered in the region (Binswanger 
and van den Brink, 2005).
54 See Boucher et al. (2008) for a model that explains risk rationing by borrowers who choose to not borrow after receiving land titles. For a detailed discussion 
about why land reforms dating to the 1950s have not resulted in a greater use of land as collateral for loans in Kenya, see Johnson (2004).
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The way forward 
This review summarised a broad set of innovations to 
improve access to sustainable financial services for 
agriculture and rural sub-Saharan Africa, along with 
their strengths and weaknesses. Many focus on credit 
to reduce the perceived financial constraints of farmers 
and agribusinesses. Much of the emphasis is narrowly 
focused on value chains rather than improving access 
for broader segments of the rural population. Therefore, 
broad access to financial services is increasing slowly. 
Fortunately, innovations have been made in savings 
that the African population has found to be of great 
value. In addition, the financial infrastructure has slowly 
improved, but the benefits for the entire financial system 
have been slow to materialise. The rate of innovation is 
faster in East Africa than elsewhere, so the applications 
must be evaluated to determine the adaptations needed 
for replication in other countries. Many innovations are 
still in early stages of design and implementation, so 
potential limitations and unintended consequences may 
not yet be obvious. Moreover, many innovations either 
lack thorough evaluations, or the evaluations lack rigor. 
Among the innovations, two are especially dynamic 
and potentially transformative. They deserve careful 
expansion and replication. The first is the rapid spread 
of Sgs. The formation of these groups is a low-tech, 
bottom–up, people-oriented approach to inclusive 
finance. They are widely accepted by their members 
as a valued substitute or complement to traditional 
indigenous informal groups. They facilitate local-level 
financial intermediation and help establish trust and 
strengthen governance skills among members.55 once 
the first Sgs are formed in a region by facilitating 
organisations, they can be multiplied inexpensively by 
volunteer organisers. Linkages between Sgs and FSPs 
can develop naturally as groups mature and members 
demand other financial services. As often occurs with 
MFI group lending, members may eventually prefer to 
graduate to individual financial products. At this stage, 
facilitators can play a useful role by assisting mature 
groups and FSPs to consider linkages, provided 
that safeguards are created and members given 
financial education to carefully weigh advantages 
and disadvantages. The case against linkages is 
that lacking careful design and implementation, the 
discipline created through mobilising group savings 
and balancing the interests of savers and borrowers 
may be undermined. These attributes may be damaged 
if linkage projects simply monitor and incentivise 
number of linkages formed or loans made by FSPs to 
group members. 
Sgs are created in most African countries with the 
aid of ngo and volunteer facilitators, so a three-part 
assessment is necessary in each country to develop 
policies and projects for moving forward. First, the 
progress made in forming Sgs, the impacts achieved 
and their capacity for effectively managing linkage 
relationships need to be evaluated. one key question is 
whether men can benefit from Sgs when most groups 
are women-only. Second, FSPs need to be surveyed 
to determine possible candidates for linkages and 
their willingness to create appropriate products and 
polices. Barriers need to be identified, such as lack 
of mobile phones and charging facilities, expertise 
on how to use them and high transaction costs in 
55 Evaluations show mixed results on the extent to which SGs create social capital so there are spill-over effects onto other local development activities. See 
Ashe and Jagger Neilan (2014). 
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accessing agents and FSPs in areas where they 
are few.56 Third, Sg facilitators and candidate FSPs 
must jointly develop plans for linkage procedures and 
products, financial education for members and reducing 
bottlenecks.57 These will be time-consuming steps and 
will require adequate funding and commitment from all 
parties involved. 
The second notable innovation is the rapidly expanding 
use of ICTs in finance in Africa, and especially the 
creative explosion in mobile phone applications. This 
is a high-tech, top–down revolution in which telecoms, 
FSPs and governmental and international agencies are 
testing applications to determine which best meet their 
objectives. The use of these technologies for financial 
services is in early stages so the full potential, impacts 
and unexpected consequences are yet unknown. 
Several tasks must be undertaken to identify what 
is required to advance these innovations. The first is 
to analyse why East Africa has advanced so rapidly 
compared to other regions. Possible explanations 
may be number and mix of mobile phone providers, 
the nature of competition and cooperation between 
telecoms and FSPs, population density and level of 
poverty, number of rural to urban migrants sending 
money home, societal openness to new technology 
and the regulatory environment for telecoms and FSPs. 
Constraints must be identified in each country along 
with plans to reduce them. 
Second, there is much to learn about the formal 
products and services rural people desire to meet 
their financial needs in addition to the informal sources 
already available. To date, users in urban areas have 
benefitted the most and providers have assumed a 
natural expansion from urban to rural areas but there 
has been little investment to understand rural areas and 
design products accordingly. It is not obvious that using 
mobile money for money transfers and remittances 
will significantly reduce barriers to other financial 
services in rural areas with few agents and FSPs. It is 
possible a two-tiered financial system will emerge: one 
composed of higher income urban users who benefit 
from both digital finance and financial services supplied 
in traditional forms from FSPs, while in rural areas 
some financial needs will be served by digital finance 
but others will not because of the limited availability of 
agents or FSPs. 
Third, the innovation of digital data for credit scoring 
is an interesting possibility to reduce information 
problems for FSPs supplying credit and insurance. It 
may improve access for data-rich urban mobile users, 
but have limited relevance for data-poor rural users 
unless the designers incorporate indicators to predict 
smallholder creditworthiness. Digital information needs 
to flow from telecoms to FSPs so users can access 
financial services. In addition, people develop reputation 
capital by using local informal financial products such 
as participating in Sgs. To increase financial inclusion, 
FSPs must find methods to incorporate reputational 
capital into their decision making because it is not easily 
captured in credit scoring or by credit bureaus.
Fourth, and finally, the potential benefits derived from 
many digital applications seem obvious and may prove 
to be important drivers of financial inclusion. But digital 
financial services pose risks as well as benefits for 
FSPs and their clients.58 The recent use and abuse 
of mobile phone and other digital data by businesses, 
governmental agencies and cybercriminals in developed 
countries vividly demonstrate issues that developing 
nations must also consider going forward. Unless they 
are satisfactorily resolved, they will dampen the use of 
these tools in finance. 
56 An exploratory study of 500 group members in Africa identified several barriers encountered by members in SGs with linkages to FSPs (The MasterCard 
Foundation, 2014).
57 In a recent SEEP webinar, CARE discussed how it developed linkages of SGs with banks in Kenya and Tanzania. A formal partnership was established with 
Equity Bank and the mobile communications firm Orange, and together they developed infrastructure with bank branches, mini-branches and MNO agents. A 
grant from UNCDF and the Gates Foundation subsidised some of the costs of setting up the system, SEEP’s webinar, 10 December 2014 (SEEP, 2014), SGs 
and mobile banking: CARE’s experience in Kenya and Tanzania (CARE, 2013). 
58 Several risks for MFIs were identified in Digital Financial Services Working Group (2014).
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